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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON 
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO 
CROOKSTON HACKING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940190-CA 
Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended 1992). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case involves an appeal from the trial judge's order upholding and supporting 
a recommendation made by the trial court's domestic relations commissioner, based upon 
the status of the record and the default of Defendant/Appellant Hacking. A change of 
custody is involved, together with an award of child support and attorney fees. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the District Judge abuse his discretion by failing to set aside Hacking's 
default? 
2. Is Appellant Hacking entitled to the privileges of a litigant at this time? 
3. May Appellant raise issues on appeal which were not argued to the District 
Judge? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court must determine whether or not the lower court committed a clear abuse 
of discretion. Miller v. BrocksmitK 825 P.2d 690 (Ut App., 1992); Fackrell v. FackrelL 740 
P.2d 1318 (Utah, 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After long-term and continued efforts by Hacking to prevent and discourage contact 
with his children by Mr. Crookston, he filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce seeking a change of custody, child support, and attorney fees. Over a six-month 
period following service, despite five (5) written notices to file an answer or her default 
would be entered, and various verbal requests for an answer, Hacking filed no answer and 
her default was entered. Hacking moved to set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b) 
(although no default judgment had been entered). Crookston asked for default judgment. 
Crookston opposed Hacking's motion, but Hacking ignored Crookston's motion. Hacking's 
motion was denied while Crookston's was granted by the Domestic Relations Commissioner. 
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The District Judge upheld the Commissioner's rulings. Evidence before both the 
Commissioner and the District Judge consisted of affidavits and the verified petition, 
establishing uncontrovertedly the necessary change of circumstances and best interests of 
the children. Hacking has been adjudged guilty of contempt, has not purged herself of 
contempt, and is barred from litigant privileges. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on April 12,1980. By the summer of 1988, they had 
three (3) children. (Verified Complaint, paragraphs 2 and 5, R-2 and R-3) 
2. The marriage suffered difficulties, and on August 13, 1988, Defendant/ 
Appellant Hacking took the children and absconded with them, leaving no word where she 
and the children could be located. She told friends that she would not permit any visitation 
until divorce proceedings were finalized. (Verified Complaint, paragraphs 12 through 14, 
R-5) 
3. Plaintiff/Appellee Crookston filed his Verified Complaint on September 9, 
1988, and obtained a Temporary Order of Visitation on September 13, 1988. (Verified 
Complaint, R-2 through R-7, and Temporary Order of Visitation, R-9 and R-10) 
4. Following appearances by counsel on October 4,1988, Crookston obtained an 
"Order of Temporary Visitation". (R-42 through R-45) 
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5. An evidentiary hearing concerning temporary visitation was held on December 
21, 1988, in which Hacking opposed visitation by Crookston, claiming he was physically and 
emotionally abusive to the children. The Commissioner found that: 
A. Hacking took the children with her and abandoned the residence of the 
parties and did not inform Crookston of her destination. 
B. Crookston did not physically abuse the children, despite Hacking's 
contrary claims. 
C. Emotional distress was caused to the children when the parties fought 
and quarreled in the children's presence. 
As a result of the evidentiary hearing, a Visitation Order was issued on December 30, 1988. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 4 through 6, R-83 through R-88, at 
R-84; and Visitation Order, R-89 through R-91) 
6. Trial was set for September 14, 1989, but was vacated because Crookston and 
Hacking were attempting reconciliation. (Stipulation to Vacate Trial Setting, R-96; and 
Order Vacating Trial Setting, R-97 and R-98) 
7. Efforts at reconciliation failed. An agreed resolution was reached and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce were executed by the 
Court on September 13, 1990, and entered on September 28, 1990. (R-116 through R-126) 
8. Within six (6) weeks of the execution of the final divorce documents, Hacking 
left the State of Utah under the following conditions: 
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A. She lied to Crookston about her living circumstances, saying she was 
living with "Cindy" when she and the children were really living with Scott Hacking, 
to whom she was not married. (Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph 
5, R-129 through R-133, at R-130) 
B. Crookston was not permitted to visit with the children after the 
October 27-28, 1990 weekend. (Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph 
6, supra, at R-30) 
C She moved to the State of Washington, but refused to make her 
address known to Crookston or friends. (Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
paragraph 8, supra, at R-130) 
D. She stated several times that Crookston should have no contact with 
her or the children, using words like "she and the kids should get on with their lives, 
without you". Her purpose in going to Washington and hiding there was to 
terminate Crookston's relationship with his children. (Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce, paragraph 9, supra, at R-130 and R-131) 
9. Crookston filed his first Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in January of 
1991. Because he had no access to her address, he was forced to take steps to acquire it 
from the Office of Recovery Services by a subpoena duces tecum. The address was 
obtained, and an Order to Show Cause was served on Hacking at the new address. (See 
Motion for Service by Publication, R-134 through R-136; Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
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and for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum, R-137 and R-138); Affidavit of Michael 
Eugene Crookston, R-139 through R-142; Order to Show Cause, R-143 and R-144; and 
Affidavit/Proof of Service, R-148) 
10. After service of the Order to Show Cause on her, Hacking agreed to provide 
contact and visitation (after a five-month hiatus in the same) and the hearing on the Order 
to Show Cause was continued without date. (See Order Continuing Hearing, dated April 
1, 1991, approved by Stephen W. Julien, then attorney for Hacking, R-149 and R-150) 
11. On October 10, 1991, Utah Legal Services, Inc., acting through attorney 
Kenneth E. Bresin, was permitted to withdraw from Hacking's representation because she 
failed to keep contact with her attorneys, did not informed them of her then-current address 
or phone number, and failed to respond to their letters asking her to contact them. 
(Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, R-151; Notice of Hearing for Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel, R-152 and R-153; and Order Allowing Withdrawal as Counsel, R-154 and R-155) 
12. In or about March of 1991, Hacking moved back to Utah. She made various 
moves within Utah thereafter. (Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph 
4B(4) through (6), R-160 through R-165, at R-161 and R-162) 
13. On or about March 16, 1992, Hacking again absconded from the State of 
Utah, leaving no forwarding address and taking the children with her. (Verified Petition 
to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph 4B(8), supra, at R-162) 
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14. Plaintiff filed his Verified Petition Modify Decree of Divorce on May 4, 1992. 
(R-160 through R-165) 
15. Hacking was served personally with the Summons and Verified Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce, in North Bend, Oregon, on May 5, 1992. She was served at 
2267 Sherman, North Bend, Oregon. (See Affidavit/Proof of Service, R-167) 
16. She was served with a 30-day Summons. The time for answering said 
Summons expired on or about June 4, 1992. (See Summons, R-166) 
17. At approximately the expiration of time for Appellant Hacking to answer, 
counsel for Crookston received a telephone call from an attorney in Northern Utah, 
believed to be Richard S. Clark, II. Said attorney indicated that he was representing 
Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, and inquired as to whether Mr. Crookston would consent 
to a change of venue to Northern Utah. (See paragraph 5, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, 
R-192 through R-197, at R-193) 
18. Willard R. Bishop forgot the name of the attorney who telephoned him, and 
because no address or telephone number had been given, could not follow the matter up. 
(See paragraphs 5 and 6, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-193) 
19. On June 30, 1992, in an effort to get matters moving forward, counsel for 
Crookston executed a "Notice of Intent to Enter Default" which indicated that within 10 
days of June 30, 1992, he intended to enter Defendant's default, unless an appropriate 
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response was filed. (See Notice of Intent to Enter Default, R-168 and R-169 and 
paragraph 7, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-193) 
20. A copy of the "Notice of Intent to Enter Default", along with a letter from Mr. 
Crookston's counsel, was sent to Mrs. Rebecca A. Crookston, at 2267 Sherman, North 
Bend, Oregon 97459, on June 30, 1992. Mrs. Crookston/Hacking was requested to contact 
her attorney, if she had one, and have him get in touch with Mr. Crookston's attorney. No 
appearance had ever been filed by any attorney in connection with pending matters, insofar 
as representation of Hacking was concerned. (See paragraph 8, Affidavit of Willard R. 
Bishop, supra, at R-193 and R-194, and letter, at R-198) 
21. On or about July 1, 1992, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, telephoned Crookston's 
counsel's office. His counsel was not in. Crookston's counsel dictated a letter to Mr. Clark, 
documenting the prior contact. In his letter of July 7, 1992, Crookston's counsel recited the 
fact that Mr. Clark was going to prepare documentation concerning a possible change of 
venue, and that Defendant/Appellee's attorney was going to contact Mr. Crookston 
concerning such a change of venue, and informed Mr. Clark that Mr. Crookston would not 
consent to such a change. Crookston's attorney then requested, in writing, that Mr. Clark 
enter an appearance in behalf of Hacking, if he was going to be representing her. He also 
requested that a response to the petition be filed promptly. (See paragraph 9, Affidavit 
of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-194, and letter of July 7, 1992, to Mr. Richard S. Clark, 
II, at R-201 and R-202) 
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22. Nothing occurred between July 7, 1992 and July 27, 1992. On July 27, 1992, 
Mr. Crookston's attorney wrote to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, and requested that a formal 
response be filed on or before August 1, 1992, and indicated that if it was not, he intended 
to enter the default of Mrs. Crookston. (See paragraph 10, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, 
supra, at and copy of letter of July 27, 1992, at R-203) 
23. During late July or early August of 1992, Mr. Richard S. Clark contacted Mr. 
Crookston's attorney. Mr. Clark stated that he had checked out the law, and that there 
would be no motion for change of venue filed. Mr. Clark agreed that venue must remain 
in Washington County. (See paragraph 11, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-195) 
24. Also in late July and early August of 1992, Mr. Crookston's attorney spoke 
several times with Mr. Clark concerning the exercise of summer visitation by Mr. Crookston. 
That visitation was eventually worked out. (See paragraph 12, Affidavit of Willard R. 
Bishop, supra, at R-195) 
25. No statement was ever made by Plaintif f/Appellee's lawyer that Hacking would 
not be required to file an answer. On various occasions, Mr. Clark stated that an answer 
would be filed shortly. No answer was ever filed. (See paragraph 13, Affidavit of Willard 
R. Bishop, supra, at R-195) 
26. On or about November 3, 1992, Crookston's attorney wrote to Mr. Richard 
S. Clark, II, and stated that unless an answer was filed within five days of November 3, 
1992, he was going to enter the default of Hacking. That letter was never returned by the 
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United States Postal Service, and was sent to the address at which Crookston's attorney had 
previously had written communication with Richard S. Clark, II. (See paragraph 14, 
Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-195) 
27. On November 13, 1992, when no answer had been filed, Plaintiffs attorney 
sent a Default Certificate to the Clerk of Court. The default of Defendant Rebecca Ann 
Batio Crookston (Hacking) was entered on or about November 17, 1992. (See paragraph 
15, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-195) 
28. Sometime between November 18, 1992, and November 24, 1992, Willard R. 
Bishop received a telephone call from Mr. Richard S. Clark, IL Mr. Clark wanted to know 
the status of the case. Mr. Bishop informed Mr. Clark that a Default Certificate had been 
entered on November 17, 1992. (See paragraph 16, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, 
at R-196) 
29. Mr. Clark then stated he would file a motion to set aside the default. He 
asserted that no answer had been filed because he could not get Rebecca Ann Batio 
Crookston to return to him a verified response, and indicated that he, himself, was 
undergoing domestic difficulties. (See paragraph 17, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, 
at R-196) 
30. When Plaintiffs attorney received no motion to set aside the default from Mr. 
Clark, he had no alternative except to move forward. On January 18, 1993, he took steps 
to file a "Motion for Default Judgment". (See paragraph 18, Affidavit of Willard R. 
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Bishop, supra, at R-196; Motion for Default Judgment, R-178 through R-180; and Affidavit 
of Willard R. Bishop, R-173 through R-177) 
31. In his Motion for Default Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Willard R. 
Bishop, and the Affidavit of Michael Eugene Crookston: 
A. Asked that custody be changed; 
B. Requested an award of child support per the applicable guidelines, 
using income imputed to Hacking at minimum wage; and 
C Asked for an award of costs and attorney fees. 
At no time before or at the time of the hearing on the Motion for Default Judgment by 
Commissioner Lema did Hacking or her attorneys file any objection to the relief requested, 
or object to it in any way. (See record prior to November 18, 1993) 
32. At all times following July 27, 1992, copies of documents generated by 
Crookston's attorney were sent to Richard S. Clark, II, even after the entry of Hacking's 
default. Those documents were sent to the only address which had ever been provided by 
Richard S. Clark, II, which was 590 North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601. Copies of the 
same documents were sent directly to Mrs. Hacking, also, since Mr. Clark had never entered 
a formal appearance for her. None of those documents were ever returned to Crookston's 
attorney by the United States Postal Service. (See paragraph 19, Affidavit of Willard R. 
Bishop, supra, at R-196) 
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33. On or about Tuesday, February 16, 1993, Crookston's attorney received 
certain documents from Richard S. Clark, II, in which he was informed that Mr. Clark's 
address was to be 1805 North Oakridge Lane, Provo, Utah 84604. This was the first time 
that information was ever provided, to the effect that Mr. Clark's address was anything 
other than 590 North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601. (See paragraph 20, Affidavit of 
Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-196 and R-197) 
34. On February 18, 1993, Hacking, through Mr. Clark, filed her Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment and her Memorandum In Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, claiming "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" under Rule 
60(b)(1). (R-181 through R-184) Mr. Clark claimed in his memorandum: 
A. That a verified answer was sent to Hacking, but was not returned 
because of her "relocation". (R-182) 
B. That Clark was separated and divorced in the fall of 1992 and did not 
thereafter receive correspondence mailed to his prior address. (R-183) 
C. That Clark's failure to communicate a new address to Crookston's 
lawyer was "excusable neglect". (R-183) 
D. That communication with Hacking was difficult because of moves she 
made, the implication being that Hacking failed to stay in touch with him. (R-183) 
35. In his "Affidavit of Richard S. Clark, II", Mr. Clark stated: 
A. That he received the "verified complaint" (sic) from Hacking. (R-185) 
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B. That he separated in the summer of 1992, but left his mailing address 
at 590 North 700 West in Provo, when IK pinions!', Innl ll. L ,'ili1 iiiijil'iiiig 
that she did not give him his mail (R-186) 
C. 1 
Crookston. (R-186) 
D. 1 nt several verified answers to Ilacking, which 
were returned by the Postal Service. (R-186) 
E. That Hacking received the Motion for Default Judgment, contacted 
him, gave him her address and pi mi in iiumhi i iiml lh I I In i " ^ nuld In i Itn lilim 
"problems communicating with (his) client." (R-186) 
36. CI.ill | i pmii i| in hit in 'i in in i in I \ ii| in mi in Mumiili, Decree of Divorce. 
The document was not venfied, despite his prior insistence that Hacking should file a 
verified answer. Hacking was in default, and no permission of Court was ever obtained to 
file that document (R-187 through R-188) Later 
the question, of whether or not Clark was entitled to practice law in February of 1993. 
(R-249; R-340, lines 20 tin < >ugh 22) 
37. All pending motions were thereaftei set for hearing before Commissioner 
li mi i i in in I mi I mi mi1 INI i IN i HI in i n t ( 1 c i i i i i i u , , i < ; i i i . i l l in I in in mi i 
38. A day oi two before July 15, 1993, Mr. Clark contacted Mr. Bishop. Clark 
indicated he had a problem with his bar status and tried to force a choice of placing the 
13 
case on "hold" until he was back in good standing, or withdrawing from the case. Mr. Clark 
was told that he should do what he had to do, but that Mr. Crookston would move ahead. 
Clark said he would withdraw immediately, but did not do so. (R-361, lines 14 through 25) 
It is questionable whether he could withdraw without Court permission. 
39. Counsel for Crookston appeared on July 15, 1993. Over his objection, the 
matter was continued because Clark apparently had an ex parte contact with the 
Commissioner the night before. (R-218, and R-362, lines 1 through 6) 
40. Clark finally faxed a Notice of Withdrawal to the Clerk on August 5, 1993. 
(R-219) 
41. Hacking was given an appropriate Notice to Appoint Counsel or Represent 
Self on August 27, 1993. (R-222 and R-223) 
42. All pending matters were noticed for hearing on November 18, 1993. (R-229 
and R-230) 
43. On or about November 18, 1993, the district court, in the person of the 
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered default judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. The default judgment awarded 
Plaintiff/Appellee Michael Eugene Crookston the care, custody, and control of Brian 
Michael Crookston, Andrea Christine Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, the 
parties' minor children. Defendant/Appellant was required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable 
child support in accordance with the applicable guidelines which eventually worked out to 
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the amount o- ; ' ner month. Plaintiff was awarded judgment for his reasonable 
attorney fees and costs of court, being $361.98 attorney fees and $55.00 g 
$416.98. The Commissioner also signed an Order Overruling and Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Default. (R-244 through R-249; .i nl iiarayitiph I I miliums ml 1 ,inl ,i imJ t run [tisfuiis 
of Law, R-430 through R-437, at R-431) 
44. N<» I,11'41 |(|i M» N«,n ruth/i ,!:\ 1*I*H, Rebecca icikston Hacking had 
personal knowledge and notice of the judgment awarding the custody of the children to Mr. 
Crookston. That notice was provided to her by her attorney, Mr. Stephen W. Julien, both 
by telephonic communication and by mail. She also knew dial (lie t HIH(\ nnln injuni'il 
that physical custody of the children be delivered to Mr. Crookston, and at all times had the 
abil i ]er, 
(Paragraph 2, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra, at R-431 and R-432) 
45. Frc m. i md i iftei i eceiving knowledge and notice of the Court's order, Ms 
Hacking failed and refused to deliver the children to Mr. Crookston, and failed and refused 
to cooperate with his efforts to obtain the physical custody of the children. Mr. Crookston 
made telephone calls, wrote letters, and involved Ins jffoniu \ m dtoils In iihl.iin pliysinil 
custody of the children. ' ' without success. (Paragraph 3, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions 432) 
46. As the result of a hearing held before the Honorable James L. Shumate, 
Disliirl I idgi, oil I'ebruary 22, 1994 , said District Judge affirmed and upheld the order of 
the Domestic Relations Commissioner awarding custody to Plaintiff. (Order Overruling 
and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner, R-262 through R-264) That 
order was executed and filed on or about March 7, 1994. Following the entry of the order 
made by the Honorable James L. Shumate, and despite her knowledge and ability to comply 
therewith, Hacking continued to fail and refuse to turn the children over to Plaintiff. 
(Paragraph 4, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra, at 432). 
47. As a result of Defendant's failure to abide by the orders of the lower Court, 
Mr. Crookston was forced to make two trips to the State of Oregon in his efforts to obtain 
the custody of his children. Hacking continued to evade her responsibilities, and continued 
her efforts to prevent him from obtaining the physical custody of his children. (Paragraph 
5, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra, at R-432) 
48. Mr. Crookston's first trip to Oregon took place between March 23, and April 
2, 1994. During the first trip, he obtained a writ of assistance from the appropriate District 
Court in the State of Oregon, but despite the cooperation and assistance of the appropriate 
sheriffs office, was unable to locate and obtain physical custody of the children. Hacking 
hid herself and the children to avoid Plaintiff and his efforts to obtain the children. 
(Paragraph 6, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, above, at R-432 and R-433) 
49. Crookston thereafter was required to return again to the State of Oregon, to 
pick up the children after the Sheriff's office had located and taken them into custody. He 
finally succeeded in obtaining physical custody of the children on April 8, 1994. Since April 
16 
8, 1994, the three children have been in his physical care, custody, and control. (Paragraph 
7, Findings ) 
50. At an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District 
j.< ... ' djudged to be guilty of 
contempt of court. She was not incarcerated, but was allowed the opportunity to purge 
liei i contempt by paying Mr. Ci ookston his damages. Ms. Hacking has been 
permanently restrained and enjoined from removing the childre 11 limn I "I.IIII unhmii Cmni 
or Mr. Crookston's permission. She has also been barred by Court order from seeking any 
court relief, until yet done so. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R-430 through R-437; and Judgment and Orders, 
R--H8 (liiiiiijpji K III) 
51. Ms. Hacking is now under a Judgment for Delinquent Child Suppo I i i l! 
amount of $*>2"' ' /, which she has not paid (Judgment for Delinquent Child Support, 
R-442 through R-444) 
52. Ms. Hacking in her "Statement of Issues" claims that the lower court erred in 
not making eaching the decision 
to change custody, in Imputing a minimum wage for child support purposes without a 
li»%" in,! t\\\ .ij diiif:?, <ii 1' »i iiry lees without an evidentiary hearing. Those questions were 
never presented to the Commissioner, noi were they ever argued 1 1 he IH'.lin I Imtyy 
They are raised for the first time on appeal (See Reporter's Hearing Transcript, 
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November 18,1993, R-332 through R-343; and Reporter's Hearing Transcript, February 22, 
1994, R-344 through R-368) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After no less than five (5) written notices to respond to the Verified Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce and various verbal requests that a response be filed, Rebecca 
Crookston Hacking was in default and her default was properly entered. Both the 
Commissioner and the District Judge exercised their discretion properly, and did not abuse 
discretion in refusing to set aside the default certificate. Appellant Hacking has ignored the 
real question of whether an abuse of discretion was committed, and wants to argue issues 
which are not pertinent to a default situation. Issues concerning alleged need for findings 
of fact concerning the custody change, imputation of minimum wage for child support 
purposes, and awarding attorney fees without an evidentiary hearing cannot be argued for 
the first time on appeal. Such arguments do not apply in a default situation where no 
opposition is timely raised anyway. Appellant Hacking cannot take advantage of her own 
delicts and is, in any event, guilty of unclean hands and in contempt of court with respect 
to which she has not purged herself. She is not entitled to the privileges of a litigant and 
is barred from requesting relief from the courts until she has cleaned herself. Her pattern 
of conduct in trying to sever the father-child relationship bars her, also, from her requested 
relief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DIRECT RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT 
HACKING 
L 111 ii siUiiihoii " lint1 ii drl'aiilt has btviii mined iiiiiii, i ml is required to go to 
trial or take testimony where, as here, the uncontroverted evidence in the Verified Petition 
to ^rce st'-- ^ne, was necessarily deemed to u~ +~"" and 
established the necessary substantial change of material circumstances and be • * - ' s i if 
the children. See Stevens v. Collard. 837 P.2d 593 (Utah App., 1992), at 595, which states: 
"Read in conjunction with one another, Utah R.Civ.P. 55(a)(1) • 
and (b)(2) state that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment 
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules," "the party entitled to a 
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor." Further, 
when allegations set forth in a pleading are not contested by 
the opposing party, those allegations are deemed admitted. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 9(d) ("[A]verments in a pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the 
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading."); Murdoch v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 
P.2d 164, 169 (1971) (when a party fails to respond to a 
pleading, allegations in the pleading are "deemed admitted 
under Rule 8(d)")." 
The trial court then went on to determine from the unconti 
best interests of the children were served by the change of custody. 
Whe ltroverted 
fact that, "The change of custody from Defendant to Plaintiff is in the best interest of the 
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parties' minor children", (See paragraph 5, Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
R-163), no other findings or conclusions are required. 
2. A case cannot be set for trial so long as a default exists. 
3. The question of the award of child support and attorney fees is included in 
those matters covered by default. Evidence was taken, however in the form of affidavits 
which were not contested at the time of the hearing on Mr. Crookston's Motion for Default 
Judgment. 
4. UCA 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1953, as amended) applies only to imputation of income 
for child support calculations, not for an award of attorney fees. 
5. Appellant Hacking asserts as error, alleged failure of the lower court to make 
findings of fact or conclusions of law as to steps taken in reaching a decision to change 
custody, in imputing a minimum wage to Hacking without conducting any evidentiary 
hearing on her earnings, and awarding attorney fees without taking evidence on the financial 
situation of the parties and the reasonableness of the fee. First, Hacking had and has no 
standing to raise those issues, being in default. Second, evidence was taken as to the 
reasonableness of the fee ($361.98!). Thirdly, Hacking did not file anything against or argue 
against the matters requested in Crookston's Motion for Default Judgment, so she can't 
complain now that such relief was granted. Fourthly and finally, the arguments treated in 
this numbered paragraph were never argued to either the Commissioner or the District 
Judge, as is clearly shown by the transcripts of hearings before each. Defenses and claims 
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not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Bangerter v. 
Poultorh 663 P.2d 100 (Utah, 1983). Whei 
that the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, the Court of Appeals will not undertake 
6. No permission was ever granted Hacking to file her "Answer to Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce . In any event the document was not verified and could not raise 
any issue against Mr. Crookston's "Verified Petition to Modify Dec - ' 
7. Hacking is barred by the actions or failures of her attorneys, as are all parties. 
POINT II 
THE ACTION OF THE DISTRICT JUDGE WAS NOT AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Appellant Hacking tins noticeably failed Id JHIIIIIII! mil .HI , \\A\ iiiiiii .'i liiidli t lit' at lion iiilir 
the District Judge, or the Commissioner, constituted any abuse of discretion. 
A ttiiil u mil1 iiiliiiji, on a motion 1 ".el iisidc ii iJdl.iiill involves the trial court's 
discretionary power, and the Court of Appeals will not disturb the trial court's decision 
absent clear abuse of discretion. Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah App., 1992) 
Hacking's motion was purportedly brought under URCP 60(b)(l ), claiming mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. She failed to establish any such grounds. 
A default |udp(meiil is pi ope i w hrie a ileienrhnl demon <1rales imlifiemiee iiiiii Il hi II' 
of diligence in pursuing his or her opportunity to defend. Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1192 
(Utah, 1984). In Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah, 1973), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that it was not error to refuse to set aside a default judgment where 
a defendant failed to contact his attorney, even despite a claim that the attorney was unable 
to contact the defendant due to the defendant's long-working hours and his custom of 
visiting his wife who was terminally ill with cancer. Further, in Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 
855 (Utah, 1979), a motion to set aside default judgment was properly denied where the 
defendant offered no reasonable excuse for his nonappearance, failed to respond to 
repeated attempts to contact him concerning status of the lawsuit he knew was pending, and 
knew that he had no attorney. 
In this case, Hacking and her attorney were notified in writing no less than five (5) 
times, and various times over the phone, that an answer would be required. Those include 
(1) the Summons served on Defendant 5/5/92; (2) the Notice of Intent to Enter Default 
dated June 30, 1992; (3) the letter to Mr. Clark of 7/7/92; (4) the letter to Mr. Clark of 
7/27/94; and (5) the letter to Mr. Clark of 11/3/92. The Court certainly did not abuse its 
discretion by failing to vacate Hacking's default when she had so very many opportunities 
to avoid default. 
As Crookston sees it, Hacking is asking that her default be set aside because of the 
neglect of her attorney to provide opposing counsel with his new address, and her own 
neglect in failing to stay in touch with her attorney. Those claims do not constitute 
"mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect". 
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POINT III 
HACKING IS BARRED FROM PROSECUTING HER 
APPEAL BECAUSE SHE HAS UNCLEAN HANDS, IS 
GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, HAS NOT PURGED 
HERSELF OF THAT CONTEMPT, AND IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO PRIVILEGES AS A LITIGANT. 
T h e Honorab le James L. Shumate held Hacking in contempt of court for he r willful 
disobedience of the trial court 's orders. I ho trial court provided an opportunity for he r to 
purge herself of contempt, of which she has failed to avail herself. T h e trial I 
her from seeking judicial relief unti l she has purged herself of contempt . (Findings of Fact 
< 
It is generally accepted that equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose conduct 
effort to remove children from the State of Utah . As a result, the Utah Supreme Cour t 
upheld the trial court 's decision severely restricting his visitation rights, because he was in 
contempt of court for failuie ft* pny i lliiiiiliiil ' i ip | ml .in Il III' i .ill In iiiplm^ In n iiiiiii i III 
children. 
In Bake/ \. Huh t, 2/1 P \ i I""' (Hi, in, Pi'.ll), Hn Ui.ili Supreme ( ui it stated, at 
page 2: 
"It is a general rule that a party who is in contempt will not be 
heard by the Court when he wishes to make a motion or grant 
a favor, and if a party files a pleading while in contempt, it will 
be stricken from the file on motion." 
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That position continues to be good Utah law. In Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P.2d 1132 
(Utah, 1977), the Utah Supreme Court again stated, probably quoting from Baker: 
"It is the general rule that a party in contempt will not be heard 
by the Court when he wishes to make a motion or grant a 
favor." 
In this case, the actions of Hacking are simply inexcusable. Beginning with the 
opening salvo back in 1988, she has routinely and continuously done everything she could 
to thwart the rights of Mr. Crookston, destroy his relationship with his children contrary to 
their best interests, and to disobey the orders of the Court. This Court cannot honor any 
request she now makes, unless and until such time as she purges herself of contempt of 
Court. To hold otherwise would be to condone Hacking's contumacious conduct, and 
further encourage her disobedience of the law, to the harm of Crookston and the children. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Hacking is not entitled to request any relief from this Court because of her unpurged 
contempt. She has not established any ground for relief under URCP 60(b)(1), and 
certainly has not established any clear abuse of discretion by the Honorable James L. 
Shumate, District Judge. She cannot raise issues on appeal for the first time. The change 
of custody is appropriate and called for in every way. The children are thriving with their 
father, having been in his home since April 8, 1994. Other orders made by the trial court 
are appropriate and proper in all respects. Hacking's appeal should be dismissed, and this 
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Court should remand the case to Judge Shumate to determine an appropriate amount of 
attorney fees and costs to be awarded Crookston in ( mini i lion uiili (In appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H H - day/ of August, 1994. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ f f L day of August, 1994,1 delivered two full, 
true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of Appellee Michael Eugene Crookston", to 
theoffiK Mi Strphi n V\ lulu ii I M| ill I l.ih I civil SITVKTS Im , ,il 'Id South ,'IK) wrsl, 
Cedar City, Utah 84720. , / / / /. 
A D D E N D U M 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, ) Civil No. 884502229DA 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, who represents and petitions the Court as 
follows: 
1. On or about September 13, 1990, the above-entitled Court 
executed its Decree of Divorce in this action. 
2. Among other things, the Decree of Divorce awarded 
Defendant the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor 
children, being Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea Christine 
Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston. Plaintiff was awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation, specified in detail in the Decree 
of Divorce. 
3. The award of custody and visitation was accomplished by 
agreement, pursuant to a certain "Stipulation for Settlement". The 
custody and visitation questions in the case were not litigated. 
4. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, circumstances 
with respect to the custody, visitation, and support of the 
children have changed substantially, as follows: 
/ Co ooi 
- - '••" '» .'..; i : i ;j 
" *^J.C 
A. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff's rights of 
visitation with the children, by falsely informing Plaintiff 
of where she and the children were living, and thereafter, by 
leaving the State of Utah and not providing Plaintiff with the 
address of the children. 
B. Defendant has wrongfully subjected the parties' 
minor children to numerous residents and school changes, as 
follows: 
(1) At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Defendant and the children were living with Defendant's 
mother in Provo, Utah. The children were attending 
Joaquin School in Provo. 
(2) On or about October 31, 1990, Defendant 
absconded from the State of Utah, taking the children 
with her, and moved to Tacoma where she resided with one 
Scott Hacking, to whom she was not married. The 
children, of course, were required to change schools 
also. 
(3) In or about the month of February of 1991, 
Defendant moved to Coos' Bay, Oregon, where she lived 
with either her mother or her grandmother. The children, 
of course, were once again required to change schools. 
(4) In or about the month of March of 1991, 
Plaintiff returned to Provo to yet another residence, 
enrolling the children once again in the Joaquin School. 
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At this time, she lived with a friend by the name of 
"Cindy". 
(5) In or about May of 1991, Defendant moved to yet 
another residence in Provo where she resided once again 
with Scott Hacking, This move required that the children 
be enrolled in Timpanogos Elementary School. 
(6) At or about Thanksgiving in November of 1991, 
Defendant moved to 2537 South Lakecrest, #2 (1810 West), 
West Valley City, Utah 84120, where she lived once again 
with Scott Hacking. The children were required to change 
to the Redwood Elementary School. 
(7) In or about early March of 1992, Defendant 
indicated her desire to move back to Coos' Bay, Oregon, 
which would require yet another change of residence and 
schools for the children. 
(8) On or about March 16, 1992, Defendant absconded 
from the State of Utah, leaving no forwarding address and 
taking the children with her. 
C. Prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Defendant's housekeeping habits were acceptable. Since then, 
however, those habits have deteriorated to the point that the 
children are not kept clean and their clothing and environment 
emit bad odors. 
D, On or about March 4, 1992, Plaintiff remarried. He 
now resides in a home purchased by him at 8845 South 630 East, 
Sandy, Utah 84070, and can provide the children with a living 
3
 003 
environment superior to that of Defendant, and can provide the 
children with a stable, two-parent home, where they will not 
be required to make constant moves and constant changes of 
school. 
5. The change of custody from Defendant to Plaintiff is in 
the best interest of the parties' minor children. 
6. Although it was anticipated at the time the Decree of 
Divorce was entered that Defendant would obtain employment, she has 
remained unemployed. Insofar as Plaintiff knows, Defendant 
receives aid from AFDC. Scott Hacking, with whom she is living 
without benefit of clergy, receives some form of disability 
payments. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows: 
1. That the Decree of Divorce in this matter be modified as 
follows: 
A. To change custody of the parties' minor children 
from Defendant to Plaintiff, subject to rights of reasonable 
visitation in Defendant. 
B. To provide for child support bo be paid by Defendant 
to Plaintiff, in accordance with the applicable guidelines. 
2. That Plaintiff be awarded his attorney fees, costs of 
court, and such other and further relief as the Court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
3. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DATED this day of March, 1992. 
MICHAEL EUGEtfE CROOKSTON 
4 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
COMES NOW MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, who being first duly sworn 
oath, deposes and states that he is the Plaintiff named above, that 
he has read and is familiar with the allegations contained in the 
within and foregoing Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
and that the matters stated in said Petition are true, according to 
his own best knowledge, information, and belief. 
DATED this S-O day of March, 1992. 
Sfes^ 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON 
0 j ^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /-# day of March, 
1992 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires: Residing in: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document to Mr. Paul F. Graf, Esq., 
Assistant Attorney General, Utah State Department of Human 
Services, Office of Recovery Services, at 168 North 100 East, St. 
I^I 005 
George, Utah 84770, by f i r s t - c l a s s mail, postage ful ly prepaid t h i s 
J T ^ d a v of &£&{ 1992. 
<C 
0j a ^i^aTTpTur^J 
Secretary /I 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF WILLARD R. 
Plaintiff, ) BISHOP 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 894502229DA 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, ) Honorable Marlynn B. Lema 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Iron ) 
COMES NOW WILLARD R. BISHOP, who being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is an adult, male resident of Iron County, State of Utah, fully 
competent to testify concerning matters set forth hereafter and makes this affidavit upon 
personal knowledge. 
2. Affiant is a duly licensed member of the Utah State Bar, and is counsel of 
record for Plaintiff in this action. 
/?£• 007 
3. On or about May 5, 1992, Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston was 
duly served with process. See "Affidavit/Proof of Service" in the file. 
4. Defendant was served with a 30-day Summons. The time for answering 
said Summons expired on or about June 4, 1992. 
5. At approximately the time of expiration of the time to answer, Affiant 
received a telephone call from an attorney in Northern Utah. Affiant believes that said 
attorney was Richard S. Clark, II. Said attorney indicated that he was representing 
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, and inquired as to whether Affiant would 
consent to a change of venue to Northern Utah. Affiant did not note down the name of 
4$ 
the attorney jrffc^called him, and was not given the attorney's address or telephone 
number. 
6. Affiant forgot the name of the attorney who telephoned him. Because 
Affiant had no indication concerning the name, address, and telephone number of the 
attorney, Affiant could not then contact him. 
7. On June 30, 1992, in an effort to get matters moving forward, Affiant 
executed a "Notice of Intent to Enter Default" which indicated that within ten days of June 
30,1992, he intended to enter Defendant's default, unless an appropriate response was 
filed sooner. See "Notice of Intent to Enter Default" in file. 
8. A copy of the "Notice of Intent to Enter Default", along with a letter from 
Affiant, was sent to Mrs. Rebecca A. Crookston, at 2267 Sherman, Northbend, Oregon 
2 
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97459, on June 30, 1992. Copies of the letter to Mrs. Crookston and of the Notice of 
Intent to Enter Default are attached, and are incorporated by this reference. In Affiant's 
letter to Mrs. Crookston, Affiant requested that she have her attorney, if any, get in touch 
with Affiant. No appearance had ever been filed by any attorney in connection with 
pending matters. 
9. On or about July 1, 1992, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, telephoned Affiant's 
office. Affiant was not in. Affiant dictated a letter to Mr. Clark, documenting the prior 
contact. In Affiant's letter of July 7,1992, Affiant recited the fact that Mr. Clark was going 
to prepare documentation concerning a possible change of venue, and Affiant was going 
to contact Mr. Crookston concerning such a change of venue, and informed Mr. Clark 
that Mr. Crookston would not consent to a change of venue. Affiant then requested, in 
writing, that Mr. Clark enter an appearance in behalf of Defendant, if he was going to be 
representing her. Affiant also requested, in writing, that a response to the Petition be 
filed promptly. See letter of July 7, 1992, to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II. 
10. Nothing occurred between July 7, 1992 and July 27, 1992. On July 27, 
1992, Affiant wrote to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, and requested that a formal response be 
filed on or before August 1, 1992, and indicated that if not, Affiant intended to enter the 
default of Mrs. Crookston. A copy of the letter of July 27, 1992, is attached and is 
incorporated by this reference. 
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11. During late July or early August of 1992, Affiant was contacted by Richard 
S. Clark, II, by telephone. Mr. Clark stated that he had checked out the law, and that 
there would be no motion for change of venue filed. Mr. Clark agreed that venue must 
remain in Washington County. 
12. Also in late July and early August of 1992, Affiant spoke several times with 
Mr. Clark concerning the exercise of summer visitation by Plaintiff. That visitation was 
eventually worked out. 
13. Affiant has no recollection that he made any statement or representation 
to Richard S. Clark that Defendant would not be required to file an answer. Affiant's 
recollection is to the effect, however, that on various occasions, Mr. Clark indicated that 
an answer would be filed shortly. No answer was ever filed. 
14. On or about November3,1992, Affiant wrote to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, and 
indicated that unless an answer was filed within five days of November 3, 1992, Affiant 
was going to enter the default of Defendant. A copy of that letter is attached, and is 
incorporated by this reference. That letter was never returned by the United States 
Postal Service, and was sent to the address at which Affiant had previously had written 
communications with Richard S. Clark, II. 
15. On November 13, 1992, when Affiant received no answer, Affiant sent a 
Default Certificate to the Clerk of Court. The default of Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio 
Crookston was entered on or about November 17, 1992. See Court file. 
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16. Sometime between November 18, 1992, and November 25, 1992, Affiant 
received a telephone call from Mr. Richard S. Clark, II. Mr. Clark wanted to know the 
status of the case. Affiant informed Mr. Clark that a Default Certificate had been entered 
on November 17, 1992. 
17. Mr. Clark then stated that he would be filing a motion to set aside the 
default. He asserted that no answer had been filed because he could not get Rebecca 
Ann Batio Crookston to return to him a verified response, and indicated that he, himself, 
was undergoing domestic difficulties. 
18. When Affiant received no motion to set aside the default from Mr. Clark, 
Affiant had no alternative except to move forward. On January 18, 1993, Affiant took 
steps to file a "Motion for Default Judgment". 
19. At all times, following July 27, 1992, copies of documents generated by 
Affiant were sent to Richard S. Clark, II, even after the entry of Defendant's default. 
Those documents were sent to the only address which had ever been provided by 
Richard S. Clark, II, to Affiant, which was 590 North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601. By 
the same token, copies of relevant documents were sent to Defendant, since Mr. Clark 
had never entered a formal appearance for her. None of those documents was ever 
returned to Affiant by the Postal Service. 
20. On or about Tuesday, February 16, 1993, Affiant received certain 
documents from Richard S. Clark, II, in which Affiant was informed that Mr. Clark's 
5 
address is now 1805 North Oakridge Lane, Provo, Utah 84604. This is the first time 
Affiant has ever been informed that Mr. Clark's address was anything other than 590 
North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this * f f i tU day of February, 1993. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this f ^ x f l d a v of February, 1 993. 
•7**~*'fli *^5*' *&ir y*^**1?^' r^ i^ cxCfvCs-c^ !:-*' ?WL~C^+ 
Etta L. Msrawy*owa 
No1-*, v Piolrc 
bnfi':"J *S L'rV.2C-Utah •;; 
$1\( '&/V.v { 1 N5V/ .5?3S ) 
fc W s ^ * » - \ V - 7 CedarC«t/,tr84720 / 
§ ^ - £ * " ^ Expires 11/17/95 J 
IJ^MMXMXIS 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires:^ 1/17/95 
Residing in: Cedar City. Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing document to Mr. Richard S,. Clark, II, Esq., Attorney at Law, at 1805 North 
Oakridge Lane, Provo, Utah 84604, both by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid this 
#TOJiav of February, 1993. 
cretary 
^/(jfcMttJli IMAJZJ 
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\ V I I , I , A K I > K. B I S H O P . 1 M \ 
ATTORNLY AT LAW 
36 NORTH 30O WEST 
P O BOX 2 7 9 
C E D A R C I T Y . U T A H 8 4 7 2 1 
801 /S86 9483 
June 30, 1992 
Mrs. Rebecca A. Crookston 
2267 Sherman 
North Bend, OR 97459 
RE: Crookston v. Crookston; My Hie No. 
WB88128 
Dear Mrs. Crookston: 
The purpose of this note is to request that you have your attorney, if any, get in 
touch with me to get this matter roiling. 
Further, demand is hereby formally made that you provide Mr. Crookston with the 
telephone number of the children, so that he may call them as is his right. 
Finally, demand is made that you contact Mr. Crookston immediately to arrange 
for the children's extended visitation with him. 
If you have retained counsel, please discuss this letter with him immediately. 
Sincerely yours, 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
WRB:em 
Enclosures 
pc Mr. Michael E. Crookston 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENTER 
DEFAULT 
Civil No. 884502229DA 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, by and througn counsel, and hereby gives notice to 
Defendant that within ten days o* the date of this instrument, he intends to enter the 
default of Defendant, in connection with Plaintiff's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce, unless an appropriate response is filed sooner. 
DATED this Wd day of June, 1992. 
oJ s | WILLARX) R. BISHOP 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing document to Mrs. Rebecca Ann Crookston, at 2267 Sherman, North Bend, 
Oregon 97459, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid this 30'li day of June, 1992. 
Secretary , 
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/>TTOPN'_Y AT LAW 
36 NORTH 3G0 WEST 
P O BOX 2 79 
C E D A R C I T Y . U T A H 0 4 7 2 1 
801 /S86-9483 
July 7, 1992 
Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
590 North 700 West 
Prove, UT 84601 
RE: Crookston v. Crookston; My File 
No. WB88128 
Dear Mr. Clark: 
Thank you for calling my office on July 1, 1992. I regret that I was not in when you 
called. 
I know that you telephoned several weeks ago. With my understanding that you 
were going to prepare documentation concerning a possible change of venue, and that 
I would then submit that question to my client for decision. I indicated to you that I 
believed that there would be no difficulty v/ith a change of venue. 
I then waited to receive documentation from you. I never did receive anything from 
you, and frankly, forgot your name since I had not written it down in the case file, you not 
having entered any appearance. 
Some time ago, v/hen I had received nothing from you, and when I could not recall 
your name, I wrote to Mrs. Crookston. I enclose copies of the documents I sent to her. 
I have discussed the possibility of a change of venue with Mr. Crookston. He 
indicated that he was not agreeable to that, and that he desired to leave the question of 
venue where it currently lies, in Washington County. 
2*1 0 1 6 
Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, Esq. 
Page Two 
July 7, 1992 
Please enter an appearance in behalf of the former Mrs. Crookston, if you are 
going to be representing her. Also, if she has any objection to the relief requested in the 
Petition which has been filed, I would appreciate it if you could file a response, promptly. 
Very cordially yours, 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
WRB:em 
pc Mr. Michael E. Crookston 
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CEDAR ClT*. UTAH 84721 
801/586 9483 
July 27, 1992 
Mr. Richard S. Clark, it, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
590 North 700 West 
Provo, LIT 84601 
RE: Crookston v. Crookston; My File No. 
WB88128 
Dear Mr. Clark: 
The purpose of this note is simply to remind you that Mr. Crookston is becoming 
somewhat disenchanted with the delays in this case. I would appreciate receiving nis 
former wife's response on or before August 1, 1992. If not, I intend to enter default. 
Mr. Crookston has attempted to contact his former wife to make arrangements for 
summer visitation, but has been thwarted. Apparently, his former wife's boyfriend 
indicated that visitation arrangements "should go through the lawyers". 
Mr. Crookston formerly requests visitation v/ith the children for the month of August 
of 1992. ! look forward to your response. 
Very cordially yours, 
WiLLARD ft BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard ft Bishop 
WRB:em 
pc Mr. Michael E. Crookston 
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November 3, 1992 
Mr. Richard S. Clark, //, Esq. 
>4ttorney at Law 
590 North 700 West 
Provof UT 84601 
RE: Crookston v. Crookston; My File 
No. WB88128 
Dear Mr. Clark: 
Just a note to let you know that unless I receive an answer within five (5) days of 
the date of this letter, I am going to enter the default of the former Mrs. Crookston. 
Very cordially yours, 
WILLARD R BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R Bishop 
WRBem 
pc Mr Michael E Crooxston 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
JUfiSftSgNT/^££ 
Civil No. 884502229DA 
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema 
This matter having come before the Court on July 15,1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's 
"Notice of Hearing", and Plaintiff having appeared by and through his attorney of record, 
Mr. Willard R. Bishop, and Defendant not having appeared personally, but the 
Commissioner having been contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark, 
II, during which contact counsel for Defendant informed the Court that he could not 
represent Defendant and would forthwith file a "Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel", and 
the Court having continued all pending motions based upon the representation that such 
a notice of withdrawal would be filed, and no such notice of withdrawal having been 
o?V9 020 
filed, and good cause appearing, the Court having considered the files and records of 
the case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's "Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment" should be and it hereby is, overruled and denied. 
RECOMMENDED this or/Uig«fitr1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
M A D ! VMM/CD I ZZKAA ^ ' MARLYNNKB. LEMA 
DomesticrRelations Commissioner 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 884502229DA 
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, 
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on July 15, 1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Motion for 
Default Judgment", brought up by Plaintiff's "Notice of Hearing". Plaintiff MICHAEL 
EUGENE CROOKSTON did not appear personally, but was represented by his attorney 
of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop, and Defendant REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON 
did not appear personally, and was not represented by counsel. The Court had been 
contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, who indicated that he could 
not represent Defendant and, as a result, would forthwith file a "Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel". Over the objections of Plaintiff's attorney, the Court continued hearing in 
2% 022 
connection with Plaintiff's "Motion for Default". The matter now having been brought 
back before the Court by Willard R. Bishop, Plaintiff's counsel, and it appearing that 
despite the representations of Richard S. Clark, II, that he would file a notice of 
withdrawal of counsel, no such notice of withdrawal has been filed, and good cause 
appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That default judgment should be and hereby is, entered in favor of Plaintiff 
Michael Eugene Crookston and against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, in 
connection with Plaintiff's "Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" on file in this 
action. 
2. That the care, custody, and control of Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea 
Christine Crookston, and Kimberiy Denece Crookston, the parties' minor children, should 
be and it hereby is, awarded to Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston, subject to rights of 
reasonable visitation in Defendant. 
3. That Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and she hereby 
is, required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable child support in accordance with the applicable 
guidelines, based upon Plaintiff's current gross income of $2,464.76 per month, and 
imputed income to Defendant at the minimal wage rate of $4.25 per hour, 40 hours per 
week, 4.3 weeks per month, for an imputed wage of Defendant in the amount of $731.00 
2 
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per month. Upon presentation of a completed, "Child Support Obligation Worksheet 
(Sole Custody)", using three children and the wages stated, Plaintiff shall be entitled to 
have the Court execute an "Order of Child Support" in the appropriate amount. 
4. That Plaintiff should be and he hereby is, awarded judgment for his 
reasonable attorney fees and costs of Court, $361.98 attorney fees as shown by the 
Affidavit of Wiilard R. Bishop, and $55.00 court costs, totaling $416.98; together with 
interest upon the declining balance of said judgment at the judgment rate of 5.72% per 
annum, from and after the execution of this document until paid in full. 
RECOMMENDED this / f ^ d a v of August 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
URLYNN B^»$v ^ S i l F '' # 
Domestic RelatS^<^imm^?>ner 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801)586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, ) 
) ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING 
Plaintiff, ) OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION 
) OF COMMISSIONER 
vs. ) 
) * 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, ) Civil No. 8/045O2229DA 
) Honorable James L Shumate 
Defendant. ) 
) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Court on 
Tuesdav, February 22, 1994, pursuant to Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston's 
"Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner". Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio 
Crookston did not appear personally, but was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. 
Stephen W. Julien, Esq., of Utah Legal Services, Inc. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston 
appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. 
Bishop. Argument was had. The Court having reviewed the files and records of the 
case, having heard oral argument, and having determined that the files and records of 
the case show the consistent color of the efforts of Defendant to frustrate Plaintiff's 
£?££ 025 
parental rights insofar as the children of the parties are concerned, and having 
determined that the decision of the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, insofar as it pertains to the "Order Overruling and Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Default" and the "Default Judgment" entered in this matter on November 18,1993, 
is correct in all respects, from both procedural and substantive standpoints, and good 
cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That the "Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner" filed by 
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and it hereby is, overruled and 
denied. 
2. That the "Order and Overruling Denying Motion to Set Aside Default" and 
the "Default Judgment" executed by the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, November 18, 1993, and entered on the same date, should be and 
hereby are, adopted as the order and decision of the Court; provided, however, that 
2 
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pursuant to Rule 6-401(4), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, said decisions have 
been the order of the Court from the time of their entry, not having been modified. 
DATED this J day of <Febfuary, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAIvlES" L. SHUMATE, District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM < L 
^O 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STEPHEN W. JULIEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, nka 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON 
HACKING, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Trial Court No. 884502229DA 
Court of Appeals No. 940190-CA 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
James L Shumate, District Judge, on May 31, 1994, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Order to 
Show Cause", Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order Overruling 
and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", Plaintiff's "Motion for 
Award of Damages", Defendant's "Motion for Specified Visitation", Defendant's "Motion 
for Investigation", and Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child 
Support and Stay Attorney Fees". Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
VJo r) 028 
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, now known as Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston 
Hacking, also appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. 
Stephen W. Julien. Witnesses were sworn and evidence, both documentary and 
testimonial in nature, was adduced. Following argument, based upon a preponderance 
of the evidence, the Court now makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about November 18,1993, this Court, in the person of the Honorable 
Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered default judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff and against Defendant. The default judgment awarded Plaintiff Michael 
Eugene Crookston the care, custody, and control of Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea 
Christine Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, the parties' minor children. 
Defendant was required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable child support in accordance with 
the applicable guidelines which eventually worked out to the amount of $171.81 per 
month. Plaintiff was awarded judgment for his reasonable attorney fees and costs of 
court, being $361.98 attorney fees and $55.00 court costs, totaling $416.98. 
2. No later than November 25,1993, Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston 
Hacking had personal knowledge and notice of the judgment awarding the custody of 
the children to Plaintiff. That notice was provided to her by her attorney, Mr. Stephen 
W. Julien, both by telephonic communication and by mail. Defendant also knew that the 
Court's order required that physical custody of the children be delivered to Plaintiff, and 
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at all times had the ability to comply with the Court's order. She simply chose not to 
comply with the order. 
3. From and after receiving knowledge and notice of the Court's order, 
Defendant failed and refused to deliver the children to Plaintiff, and failed and refused 
to cooperate with Plaintiff's efforts to obtain the physical custody of the children. Plaintiff 
made telephone calls, wrote letters, and involved his attorney in efforts to obtain physical 
custody of the children, but without success. 
4. As the result of a hearing held before the Honorable James L Shumate on 
February 22, 1994, said District Judge affirmed and upheld the order of the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner awarding custody to Plaintiff. That order was executed and filed 
on or about March 7, 1994. Following the entry of the order made by the Honorable 
James L Shumate, and despite her knowledge and ability to comply therewith, 
Defendant continued to fail and refuse to turn the children over to Plaintiff. 
5. As a result of Defendant's failures to abide by the orders of this Court, 
Plaintiff was forced to make two trips to the State of Oregon in his efforts to obtain the 
custody of his children. Defendant continued to evade her responsibilities, and 
continued her efforts to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining the physical custody of the 
children. 
6. Plaintiff's first trip to Oregon took place between March 23, and April 2, 
1994. During the first trip, he obtained a writ of assistance from the appropriate District 
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Court in the State of Oregon, but despite the cooperation and assistance of the 
appropriate sheriff's office, was unable to locate and obtain physical custody of the 
children. Defendant hid herself and the children to avoid Plaintiff and his efforts to obtain 
the children. 
7. Plaintiff thereafter was required to return again to the State of Oregon, to 
pick up the children after the Sheriff's office had located and taken them into custody. 
Plaintiff finally succeeded in obtaining physical custody of the children on April 8, 1994. 
Since April 8,1994, the three children have been in Plaintiff's physical care, custody, and 
control. 
8. In connection with his first trip to Oregon, Plaintiff incurred Oregon Court 
filing fees of $48.50, Coos' Bay Sheriff's fees of $20.00, plane fare of $274.00, car rental 
of $429.21, lodging in the amount of $315.00, gas for a rental car in the amount of 
$36.95, food in the amount of $144.03, and lost wages in the amount of $933.12. The 
Court finds that, as allowable costs, Plaintiff should be permitted to claim from Defendant 
$48.50 court costs, sheriff's fees of $20.00, plane fare of $137.00, food costs in the 
amount of $72.01, car rental in the amount of $421.41, lodging in the amount of $315.00, 
gasoline in the amount of $36.95, and lost wages of $933.12, totaling $1,984.05. 
9. In connection with the second trip, Plaintiff incurred $768.00 plane fare, 
$67.00 car rental, $20.00 gasoline costs, food in the amount of $50.00, and lost wages 
031 
in the amount of $233.28, for a total second trip cost of $1,138.28, all of which costs 
should be recovered from Defendant. 
10. Total costs incurred by Plaintiff, which are chargeable to Defendant's failure 
to abide by the orders of the Court, despite her ability to comply, come to $3,122.33. 
11. Further, in connection with his attempts to obtain the physical custody of 
the children, Plaintiff was required to incur reasonable attorney fees in the amount of 
$516.00, which he would not have been required to incur had Defendant obeyed the 
Court's orders. 
12. The Court specifically finds that Defendant is guilty of contempt of the 
orders of this Court, she having knowledge of the same and the ability to comply 
therewith, but voluntarily choosing to disobey. 
13. In mitigation, the Court finds that Defendant has a clear emotional bond 
with the children, and that while said bond is no excuse for her failure to abide by the 
Court's orders, it certainly mitigates to the extent that no jail time should be imposed, nor 
should any fine be imposed. Because of her contempt of Court, however, the Court 
finds it appropriate that the costs of the retrieval of the children, as indicated above, plus 
-9®fefi€teH^€ reasonable attorney fees associated therewith in the amount of $516.00, 
which Defendant cteaHy has the ability to pay, are appropriate and allowable to Plaintiff, 
both under applicable provisions of equity and pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A. 
78-32-11 (1953, as amended). 
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14. With respect to Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order 
Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", and with 
respect to Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay Judgment of Child Support and 
Stay Attorney Fees", the Court finds that insofar as said motions pertain to the residence 
of the children, the motions are now moot. The children are properly in the physical 
care, custody, and control of their father, Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston. Further, 
the Court finds that said motions are barred by Defendant's contempt of the orders of 
this Court, and specifically, her contempt of the default judgment entered on November 
18, 1993, and Judge Shumate's order filed on or about March 7, 1994. Defendant 
having conducted herself in contempt of this Court, is not now in a position to ask for 
a stay, or for any relief, from the orders of this Court, pursuant to applicable law, she 
having "unclean hands" and not having purged herself of contempt. Payment of 
Plaintiff's damages would purge Defendant of her contempt. 
15. With respect to Defendant's "Motion for Specified Visitation", the parties 
agreed in open court that Defendant's visitation should be specified to be that set out 
in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), subject to the following restrictions: 
A. That Defendant be enjoined and restrained permanently from 
removing the children of the parties from the State of Utah, absent written 
permission from Plaintiff, or absent permission of the Court. 
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B. That all visitation take place in the presence of a third party adult 
acceptable to the parties, and that Janet Blackburn, Defendant's sister-in-law, is 
a third-party adult, acceptable to both parties. This does not mean that visitation 
should take place only in the presence of Janet Blackburn, but means that the 
presence of any other third-party adult acceptable to both parties is also 
permissible where visitation is concerned. 
16. With respect to Defendant's "Motion for Investigation", Plaintiff indicated 
through his attorney that he, personally, had no objection to the conduct of the 
investigation requested by Defendant, and to the providing of a report concerning such 
investigation. Counsel for Plaintiff indicated that he did not believe the statute cited by 
Defendant as authority for the investigation was applicable. The Court specifically finds 
that the provisions of UCA 30-3-5.2 (1953, as amended), are sufficiently broad to include 
the allegations made by Defendant, and that an investigation thereunder is appropriate. 
17. From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant should be adjudged to be guilty of contempt of the order of this 
Court, as set forth in the default judgment dated November 18, 1993, and the "Order 
Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", dated March 
7, 1994. 
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2. Because and as a result of her contempt of Court, and pursuant to the 
provisions of UCA 78-32-11 (1953, as amended), Plaintiff should be granted judgment 
against Defendant for his costs and attorney fees in the total amount of $3,638.33, 
together with interest thereon, and upon after-accruing costs, at the judgment rate of 
5.61% per annum, from and after May 31, 1994 until paid in full. 
3. Defendant's visitation should be specified to be as stated above. 
4. An appropriate investigation should be ordered, pursuant to the provisions 
of UCA 30-3-5.2 (1953, as amended). 
5. Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order Overruling and 
Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner" and Defendant's "Motion to 
Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child Support and Stay Attorney Fees" should be 
and they hereby are, overruled and denied, for the reasons stated above, including, but 
not limited to, the fact that Plaintiff's contempt of Court prevents her from seeking relief 
from this Court until such time as she has purged herself of her co; <tempt. 
LET AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT AND ORDERS BE ENTERED. 
DATED this ?b day of O f r A / 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
J£MES L SHUMATE, District Judge 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, nka 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON 
HACKING, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS 
Trial Court No. 884502229DA 
Court of Appeals No. 940190-CA 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
James L. Shumate, District Judge, on May 31, 1994, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Order to 
Show Cause", Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order Overruling 
and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", Plaintiff's "Motion for 
Award of Damages", Defendant's "Motion for Specified Visitation", Defendant's "Motion 
for Investigation", and Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child 
Support and Stay Attorney Fees". Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
l/?> / 
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Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, now known as Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston 
Hacking, also appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. 
Stephen W. Julien. Witnesses were sworn and evidence, both documentary and 
testimonial in nature, was adduced. Argument was had. The Court having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking should be and she 
hereby is, adjudged and decreed to be in contempt of the orders of this Court, as 
contained in the Default Judgment entered on or about November 18, 1993, and the 
Order Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner, entered 
on or about March 7, 1994. 
2. That because of her contempt, Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston should 
be and he hereby is awarded judgment against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston 
Hacking, and that Plaintiff shall have and recover from Defendant his damages in the 
sum of $3,638.33, which amount consists of $3,122.33 costs of Plaintiff retrieving 
physical custody of the children, and $516.00 reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
connection with Plaintiff's efforts to obtain physical custody of the children. The total 
judgment principal amount of $3,638.33, together with accruing costs, shall bear interest 
at the judgment rate of 5.61 % per annum from and after May 31,1994, until paid in full. 
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3. That because Plaintiff consented to and agreed that Defendant's visitation 
rights be specified, and agreed with Defendant as to the nature of those visitation rights, 
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking should be and she hereby is, awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation with the parties' minor children, as set forth and delineated 
in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), subject to the following restrictions: 
A. That Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking should be and she 
hereby is, permanently enjoined and restrained from removing the parties' minor 
children from the State of Utah, without first having obtained written permission 
of Plaintiff, or alternatively, written permission of the Court. 
B. That all visitation exercised by Defendant shall take place in the 
presence of a third party adult acceptable to both parties, including, but not 
limited to, Janet Blackburn, Defendant's sister-in-law, who is an acceptable third 
party adult. 
4. That, pursuant to the provisions of UCA 30-3-5.2 (1953, as amended), the 
division of family services within the Department of Social Services, in accordance with 
Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A, Utah Code Annotated, should be and hereby is, required 
to conduct an investigation, and to conduct the same within 30 days hereof. Copies of 
the report of said investigation are to be provided to counsel, the original report being 
filed with the Court. Plaintiff had no objection to the entry of this particular order, 
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5. That Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order 
Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", and 
Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child Support and Stay 
Attorney Fees" should be and they hereby are, overruled and denied, for the reasons 
that, among other things, said motions are moot with respect to the residence and 
custody of the parties' minor children, and for the further reason that, being in contempt 
of the orders of this Court, Defendant is barred from seeking any relief from the Court 
until such time as she has purged herself of her contempt. 
DATED this I f ) day of _ . 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT FOR DELINQUENT 
) CHILD SUPPORT 
vs. ) 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, ) Trial Court No. 884502229DA 
) Court of Appeals No. 940190-CA 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
James L Shumate, District Judge, on May 31, 1994, pursuant to various matters then 
pending before the Court. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston appeared personally and 
was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendant Rebecca 
Ann Batio Crookston, now known as Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking, also 
appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Stephen W. 
Julien, Esq. Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. It appearing to the 
Court that the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor children was awarded to 
Plaintiff on or about November 18, 1993, and that in connection with the award of such 
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custody to Plaintiff, Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff child support, and the Court 
having found that Defendant has not paid any child support to Plaintiff, and is delinquent 
in child support payments from November 18, 1993 through May 31, 1994, and the 
Court having determined that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for such delinquent child 
support, and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston should be and he hereby is, 
awarded judgment against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, now known as 
Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking, for delinquent child support from and after 
November 18, 1993 through May 31, 1994. 
2. That Plaintiff shall have and recover from Defendant the following amounts 
of delinquent child support: 
For November, 1993, representing 12/30ths of $171.81. 
For December, 1993. 
For January, 1994. 
For March, 1994. 
For April, 1994. 
For May, 1994. 
TOTAL JUDGMENT PRINCIPAL 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
$ 68.72 
$171.81 
$171.81 
$171.81 
$171.81 
$171.81 
$927.77 
WJ °41 
3. That the declining balance of the total judgment principal amount of 
$927.77, together with after accruing costs, shall bear interest at the judgment rate of 
5.61% per annum until paid in full. 
DATED this X4) day of KJ Li lt\ 1994. 
BY THE COURTS*? 
trict Judge 
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